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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 20010046-SC 
VALDENCRAM, : Priority No. 13 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appealed from the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss on double 
jeopardy grounds after his trial on second degree felony tax evasion charges ended in a hung 
jury. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling. This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to its grant of certiorari review. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a), (5) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Did defendant invite any error by the trial court in declaring a mistrial where 
defendant initially asked for the mistrial and then twice declined the trial court's invitation 
to register any objection to the mistrial on the record? 
Issue 2: Did the court of appeals correctly conclude that legal necessity justified a 
mistrial where the jury announced its inability to reach a verdict, received a deadlock 
1 
instruction, and after continued deliberations again announced that it was unable to reach a 
verdict? 
Standard of Review: On certiorari, this Court reviews "the decision of the court of 
appeals, not the decision of the trial court." In reA.T., 2001 UT 82, f 5,2001 WL 1131921. 
Although the court of appeals' decision is reviewed for correctness, "[t]he correctness of the 
court of appeals' decision turns on whether that court accurately reviewed the trial court's 
decision under the appropriate standard of review." State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, f 9,22 P.3d 
1242. A trial court has "broad discretion" in deciding whether or not "manifest necessity" 
justifies discharging a hung jury. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497,509 (1978). See also 
State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354, 358-60 (Utah 1979); West Valley City v. Patten, 1999 UT 
App 149, f 7, 981 P.2d 420,422. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The text of the following applicable constitutional provisions and statutes is 
reproduced in Addendum A: 
United States Constitution, amendment V; 
Utah Constitution, article I, section 12; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403 (1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
Defendant was charged in an October 24, 1996 information with four counts of tax 
evasion, second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(l)(c) (1999) 
and § 59-l-40i(9)(c) (1996) (R. 1-2). On the State's motion, one of the counts was 
dismissed before trial (R. 49). 
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Defendant moves for a mistrial 
A jury trial on the remaining three counts took place on August 17-18,1998 (R. 640-
43,645-46; R. 846:5-183, R.802:3-237).1 The jury was excused to begin deliberating at 6:47 
p.m. on August 18 (R. 646). At 9:09 p.m., the trial court and counsel went back on the 
record (R. 646; R. 802:227). The bailiff stated that the jury had indicated they were unable 
to reach a decision (R. 802:227). The court proposed giving the jury an Allen charge, that 
is, an additional instruction which directed the jury to "consult with each other and to 
deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if it can be done without abandoning your 
individual judgment" (R. 802:227-28; Jury Instruction No. 16, R. 690).2 
Defendant, through counsel, immediately moved for a mistrial. Defense counsel 
stated that while he had no objection to the body of the Allen instruction, "I do have an 
objection as far as the giving of the instruction to the jury and would ask that the Court 
declare a hung jury and that there be a mistrial" (R. 802:227-28, Addendum B). The trial 
court inquired whether there was a basis for the defendant's objection, "other than [the fact 
that] that would be your preference?" (R. 802:228). Defense counsel's response was 
initially inaudible on the record, but he then stated, "And just the basis that they had indicated 
lThe trial transcript for August 17, 1998 is contained in the record volume number 
846. The trial transcript for August 18, 1998 is contained in the record volume numbered 
802. 
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"An Allen charge takes its name from Allen v. United States, [164 U.S. 492 
(1896)]. In Allen, the United States Supreme Court approved a supplemental instruction 
given to a jury that was having difficulty arriving at a unanimous verdict." State v. 
Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 861 (Utah 1992). 
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they could not reach a verdict" (R. 802:228). In response, the prosecutor favored giving an 
Allen instruction because "[t]wo hours isn't an excessively long time. I think we ought to 
encourage them to try one more time here" (R. 802:228). 
The trial court instructs the jury to continue deliberating 
The trial court agreed with the prosecutor, reasoning that "the jurors have been 
deliberating for a few hours In my view, the time has not been excessive with a two day 
trial. . . . I would like them to consider one other instruction to whether it makes any 
difference So, I think I will have the bailiff bring them in, read this instruction, and give 
them some additional time and then see what the result is, if anything" (R. 802:228-29). The 
court recalled the jury and read the supplemental instruction. (R. 646; R. 802:229-31). The 
trial court then excused the jury for further deliberations (R. 646; R. 802:229-31). 
The jury asks the trial court questions 
At about 9:50 p.m., approximately 40 to 45 minutes after receiving the Allen charge, 
the jury sent two written questions to the court (R. 802:231). The first note read, "On State's 
Exhibit No. 3 Utah Code Annotated § 59-10-542 (1953 as amended) we would like to know 
what that code says/'3 The court conferred with both counsel on the record and decided to 
respond that the reference to the code section on the exhibit was irrelevant and should not 
be considered by the jury (R. 802:231). 
3The jurors' notes and the trial court's responses are handwritten on two 4" by 6" 
pieces of yellow paper. They are included in the record in an unnumbered brown 
envelope containing defendant's exhibits. The two notes are not numbered. 
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The second note read, "If there is proof from the State of Utah that income is taxable 
by Utah law, was it shown in court today?" (R. 802:232). The court also discussed this note 
with both counsel and decided to respond, "This is a determination for the jury. See 
instructions 5 and 6." (Instructions 5 and 6 informed the jury that they were the sole judges 
of the evidence and the facts). The court then took another recess (R. 802:234).4 
The trial court declares a mistrial after the jury foreperson 
states that further deliberations would be futile 
At approximately 10:15 p.m., fifteen to twenty minutes after the court responded to 
the jury's questions, the bailiff again reported that the jury was unable to reach a unanimous 
verdict (R. 646; R. 802:234). The court reconvened with the jury present and engaged the 
foreperson in the following discussion: 
The Court: [T]he report I' ve received through the bailiff is that the jury has 
been unable to reach a unanimous decision. Is that correct? 
Juror Holt: Yes. 
The Court: All right. Do you think that any additional period of time for 
deliberation would make any difference? 
defendant's brief reports that while the court and counsel were framing responses 
to the jury's questions, the bailiff left and returned a few minutes later with the news that 
the jury had no further questions. Br. Aplt. 6. Defendant concedes that exchange was not 
transcribed, but asserts that it may be found on the videotape record of the proceedings 
below. Id. at 6 n.3. The videotape record of the proceedings is not part of the record on 
appeal, nor was it made a part of the record before the court of appeals. It is therefore 
improper to cite to this purported exchange and this Court may not consider it. See 
Wilderness Building Systems v. Chapman, 699 P.2d 766, 767 (Utah 1985) (appellate 
court's review is limited to evidence contained in the record on appeal). 
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Juror Holt: No. 
The Court: All right. All right. And do you have any question that you 
want to ask about that? There have been a couple of notes 
passed and some response given, although perhaps not as much 
response as you had hoped. Any question or — 
Juror Holt: No. (Inaudible) 
The Court: All right. Are those questions that you have not sent out to me 
so far? 
Mr. Holt: Well, yes and no. 
The Court: Yes and no. Okay. All right. I guess I need to make sure I 
understand then. If there were a couple of questions answered, 
do you think you could reach a verdict or it would be at least 
worth deliberating longer or do you think that would just 
confirm the positions or decisions that the jurors have reached? 
Juror Holt: Well, speaking for myself, it would probably (inaudible). 
The Court: Okay. All right. Counsel, is there any record that you would 
like to make at this point? 
Defense Counsel: I don't have anything, your Honor. 
Prosecutor: No, your Honor. 
The Court: All right All right. Well, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I'm 
not going to require you to stay any longer. I am going to 
release you from your duties here and excuse you to go home.. 
. I'm going to declare that there is a mistrial, that the jury is not 
able to reach a verdict, and I'll excuse you . . . . Counsel, is 
there anything else for the record this evening? 
Defense Counsel: No, your Honor. 
(R. 802.234-37; Addendum C). 
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The trial court scheduled a second jury trial to be held in February 1999 (R. 794). 
Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that the trial court's declaration 
of a mistrial was not supported by "manifest necessity" (R. 810-820). The trial court denied 
the motion, ruling: "[Ajccording to U.C.A. 76-1-403 and Utah case law on the issue, the 
mistrial declared in this matter on August 18,1998 was not an improper termination of the 
prosecution and resulted because the jury was unable to agree upon a verdict. The Court 
further finds a proper record was made at the time the mistrial was declared...." (R. 835; 
Addendum D). 
Court of Appeals' decision 
Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss to the court of appeals. In an 
unpublished memorandum decision issued after oral argument, the court of appeals 
unanimously affirmed the trial court. State v. Cram, 2000 UTApp 375 (Addendum E). The 
court of appeals first held that defendant had waived any claimed error when he failed to 
specifically and timely object to the trial court's declaration of a mistrial. Id. at 1-2. The 
court of appeals noted that had defendant timely objected, the trial court could have corrected 
any claimed error before the jury was discharged. Id. at 2. 
The court of appeals further observed that defendant had acknowledged "that he knew 
the [trial] court was contemplating a mistrial, but believed he was not obligated to object." 
Id. Stating that defendant's belief "was in error," the court of appeal elaborated, "'[A] 
defendant should not be permitted to forego making an objection with the strategy of 
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enhancing] the defendant's changes of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails,... claiming] 
on appeal that the Court should reverse."1 Id. (quoting State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^  11, 
10 P.3d 346) (additional internal quotation marks omitted). 
Although the court of appeals ruled defendant's claim unpreserved, it nevertheless 
addressed the merits of the claim. The court of appeals held that "legal necessity" justified 
termination of the trial based on the jury's inability to reach a verdict. Based on the 
following record facts, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in dismissing the jury when it did: (1) the dialogue between the trial court and jury 
foreperson in which the court twice asked if additional time or receiving answers to 
additional questions would facilitate a verdict, and the foreperson responded, "no," (2) the 
minute entry chronicling the time the jury deliberated, (3) the trial court's supplemental 
"deadlock" instruction, and (4) the time spent conferring with counsel. Id. at 3. 
The court of appeals rejected defendant's claim that the trial court declared a mistrial 
"so abruptly" that he did not have an opportunity to object. Id. It also observed that the trial 
court had twice asked defense counsel if he wanted "to go on record in response to the jury's 
inability to reach a verdict or inquire of the jury foreperson. Defendant's counsel declined 
on both occasions." Id. 
This Court granted defendant's timely petition for a writ of certiorari. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: Defendant invited any alleged error arising from the trial court's declaration 
of a mistrial when he first moved for a mistrial and then declined to go on the record in 
response to the jury' s inability to reach a verdict. Although the trial court denied defendant's 
motion, gave an Allen charge, and over defendant's objection, sent the jury back for further 
deliberations, defendant never withdrew his objection or otherwise notified the trial court that 
he wished the jury to continue deliberating. When the court specifically invited defendant 
to address the jury's second declaration that they were deadlocked, defense counsel merely 
stated that he had nothing to say. This failure in conjunction with his earlier motion 
constituted invited error and consent to the mistrial. 
Point II: The court of appeals properly held that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion when it determined that the jury was deadlocked and declared a mistrial. A trial 
judge's belief that a jury is genuinely deadlocked presents a classic case of legal or manifest 
necessity. A trial court has broad discretion in determining whether a jury is truly hung. 
The trial court acted well within its discretion in making that determination here. 
When the jury informed the court that it was deadlocked, the trial court gave the jury an Allen 
charge and asked it to continue deliberations. The court answered the jury's questions and 
when the jury again reported that it could not reach a verdict, the court carefully inquired of 
the foreman whether additional information or time would assist the jury to arrive at a 
decision. It was only after the foreman repeatedly assured the court that the deadlock could 
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not be resolved and the court sought the input of both counsel that it relented and declared 
the mistrial 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT INVITED THE ALLEGED ERROR HE NOW 
CLAIMS ON APPEAL, THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY 
HELD THAT HE IS NOT ENTITLED TO APPELLATE REVIEW 
Defendant first argues that the court of appeals improperly held that his failure to 
timely object below barred appellate review of his claim that the jury was prematurely 
discharged. Br. Aplt. 9-10. Defendant contends that "[i]n sum and substance, the [cjourt of 
[a]ppeals concluded that in failing to make a contemporaneous objection, [defendant] 
consented to the mistrial and could not effectively raise the issue thereafter in the trial court 
or on appeal." Br. Aplt. 10 (emphasis in original). Defendant claims that by framing the 
issue as one of preservation, "the court of appeals avoided addressing the real issue, namely, 
whether the defendant consented to the mistrial." Br. Aplt. 10. Defendant asserts that under 
controlling caselaw his "mere silence" did not amount to his consent to the mistrial. Br. Aplt. 
10-18. He also renews his claim that the trial court so abruptly declared the mistrial that he 
did not have an opportunity to object. Br. Aplt. 17. 
Contrary to defendant's claims, the court of appeals correctly concluded that 
defendant was not entitled to appellate review because, notwithstanding his claims of "mere 
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silence," defendant invited the very "error" that he now attacks on appeal.5 As the court of 
appeals also recognized, the record belies defendant's claim that the trial court's declaration 
of a mistrial unfairly surprised him. See Cram, at 3. 
A. Defendant invited the error he complains of by moving for a mistrial and, then 
despite the invitation to do so, by not objecting when the court declared one. 
This Court has "held repeatedly that on appeal, a party cannot take advantage of an 
error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing error." State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993). This rule, known as the "invited error" doctrine, 
has two principal purposes: (1) "it fortifies . . . long-established policy that the trial court 
should have the first opportunity to address the claim of error," and (2) "it discourages parties 
from intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal 
on appeal." Id. at 1220 (citations omitted). Thus, while a party may sometimes obtain "plain 
error" review of an unpreserved claim, no review is available when a party "invites" or leads 
the trial court into committing the alleged error. State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 553 n.20, 
560-561 (Utah 1987) (notwithstanding plain error exception to preservation rule, invited 
error viewed with disfavor and will operate to waive claim on appeal); Parsons v. Barnes, 
871 P.2d 516, 519 (Utah 1994) (declining to review issue where error complained of 
"smack[ed] of invited error"); State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021,1023 (Utah 1987) (declining 
Although the court of appeals appears to have treated the issue primarily as one of 
simple waiver, it also implicitly recognized that defendant invited any error by 
consciously deciding not to object. Cram, at 2. 
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to review defendant's claim that giving Allen charge was error where counsel stated on 
record that she had read the instruction and had no objection to it); see also State v. Bullock, 
791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 1989) (court will not conduct plain error review if trial counsel's 
actions amounted to active rather than passive waiver of objection). 
Defendant's conduct presents a classic case of invited error. First, defendant invited 
the trial court to discharge the jury when the jury first notified the court that it was 
deadlocked. Defendant objected to giving the jury any further instructions and asked the trial 
court to simply declare a mistrial and discharge the jury (R. 802:227-28). In short, defendant 
objected to further deliberations by the jury. 
Although the trial court denied the motion, gave an Allen charge, and, over 
defendant's objection, sent the jury back for further deliberations, defendant never withdrew 
his objection or otherwise notified the trial court that he wished the jury to continue 
deliberations (R. 802:227-29,231-37). Indeed, when the jury informed the court a second 
time that it was deadlocked, the trial court specifically invited the input of both defense 
counsel and the prosecutor (R. 802:234-37). Instead of informing the trial court that he now 
wished the jury to continue deliberations, defense counsel merely stated that he had nothing 
to say (R. 802:234-37). Defendant's studied silence at this juncture could be read only as a 
reaffirmation of his prior objection to continued deliberations by the jury. That in turn could 
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only suggest to the trial court that defendant was in fact consenting to the discharge of the 
jury.6 
B. Defendant's conduct did not constitute "mere silence/' but was an active decision 
not to object and constituted consent to discharging the jury. 
Relying on this Court's decision in State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354 (Utah 1979) and 
the court of appeals' decision in State v. Nilson, 854 P.2d 1029 (Utah App. 1993), defendant 
nevertheless asserts that "mere silence or failure to object to the jury's discharge is not such 
consent as will constitute waiver of a former jeopardy plea." Br. Aplt. 10. Even accepting 
that general proposition as true, defendant cannot reasonably characterize his statement, "I 
don't have anything, your Honor," as "mere silence" or as a simple "failure to object." This 
is particularly true where defendant had already told the court that he did object to continued 
jury deliberations. 
Defendant's reliance on Ambrose and Nilson is misplaced. The jury in 
Ambrose deliberated for approximately one hour and fifteen minutes before informing the 
court that the jurors were "having difficulty reaching a verdict." Ambrose, 598 P.2d at 356. 
After confirming that the jurors believed that further deliberations would be futile, the trial 
6Defendant suggests that the trial court specifically found that he did not consent. 
Br. Aplt. 11-12. The record does not support that suggestion. Although both parties 
argued the consent issue to the trial court, the trial court's order denying defendant's 
motion to dismiss is silent on the point and states only that the trial court believed that 
legal necessity justified the mistrial because the jury was unable to agree upon a verdict 
(R. 810-20, 824-30, 835). The fact that the trial court did not expressly find that 
defendant consented does not mean that the trial court found, or even believed, that 
defendant had not consented. 
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court asked the prosecutor for his input. Id. at 356. The prosecutor replied in front of the 
jury that it cost "about eight hundred dollars a day to run this court," and that "considering 
the costs involved, the expense, inconvenience to everybody," the jury should be urged to 
"arrive at a verdict or to exercise every conceivable effort to do so" before declaring a 
mistrial. Id. The trial court then interrupted and asked defense counsel if he considered the 
prosecutor's comments to be error. Id. Defense counsel responded, "yes," and the trial court 
immediately and without warning declared a mistrial. Id. at 356-57. 
On appeal, the State claimed the mistrial was justified because "the jury was 
hopelessly deadlocked." Id. at 358. This Court held, however, that the record suggested that 
the basis for the mistrial was not that the jury was deadlocked, but that the trial court 
considered the prosecutor's comments to be unfairly prejudicial to the defendant. Id. After 
holding that the trial court should have consulted defense counsel before discharging the jury, 
the Court rejected the State's argument that the defendant's failure to object implied that he 
consented to the mistrial and waived his double jeopardy claim. Id. at 359-60. The Court 
instead held that "mere silence in this situation can [not] be equated to waiver of such an 
important constitutional right." Id. at 360. 
Because Ambrose was never given an opportunity to object, his failure to do so did 
constitute "mere silence." In contrast, defendant here not only had an opportunity to object, 
but he affirmatively declined to do so even when invited to make a record by the trial court 
14 
(R. 802:234-37). That affirmative failure, coupled with his prior motion for mistrial, 
bespeaks much more than "mere silence" or even acquiescence. 
Nilson likewise rebuts defendant's claim of "mere silence." In Nilson, the prosecutor 
moved mid-trial to dismiss the information after the victim materially changed the time frame 
of the alleged offense and the trial court denied the prosecutor's motion to amend the 
information. Nilson, 854 P.2d at 1030. The prosecutor acknowledged on the record that the 
victim's change of testimony made it impossible for the State to prove its case and that under 
the circumstances the trial court would be obligated to sustain a motion for a directed verdict 
by the defense. Id. The prosecutor stated his intent to refile a new information alleging the 
correct dates. Id. 
After the trial court agreed that it would have no choice but to grant a motion for 
directed verdict, Nilson's attorney stated that she had no objection to "the motion to dismiss." 
Id. Defense counsel said nothing about agreeing to the charges being refiled and, in fact, 
after the jury had been excused, stated on the record that she believed that double jeopardy 
would bar a second trial. Id. 
The court of appeals held that Nilson did not consent to the refiling of charges by 
stating that he did not object to the dismissal of the charges. Id. at 1031-32. The court of 
appeals noted that it "quickly became apparent, particularly after the trial court denied the 
State's motion to amend the information that proceeding further would result in acquittal." 
Id. at 1032. Thus, the court of appeals held that when the State moved to dismiss "to 
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expedite the inevitable, Nilson had no obligation to warn that double jeopardy might bar a 
subsequent prosecution." Id. 
Unlike defendant, Nilson did not affirmatively move the court for a mistrial. Rather, 
Nilson merely agreed to a dismissal of the charges against him. That circumstance can 
hardly be equated to this situation, where defendant moved for a mistrial and then, when 
given the opportunity, affirmatively declined to withdraw his objection to further 
deliberations by the jury. 
To avoid the consequences of his invited error, defendant baldly asserts that it should 
have been obvious to the trial court that he was no longer interested in discharging the jury 
after they sent their second note to the court. Br. Aplt. 6, 17. The second note asked, "If 
there is proof from the State of Utah, that income is taxable, By law, Utah law. Was it shown 
in court Today[?]" (R. 850, Court's Ex. No. 2). Defendant claims this question "signaled a 
potential problem for the prosecution," thereby making it apparent that he no longer wanted 
a mistrial. Br. Aplt. 6,17. 
Defendant does not explain why this note obviously conveyed a new disinterest in a 
mistrial. The note merely suggested that at least one juror was laboring under the erroneous 
belief that income might not be taxable under Utah law. It certainly did not suggest that the 
basis of defendant's motion for mistrial had been obviated or that the jury was likely to reach 
a verdict anytime soon. To the contrary, the question reflected the jury's continued, 
intractably divided state, thereby suggesting that a unanimous verdict on the question of 
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defendant's personal tax liability was unlikely. Even if the note gave rise to the inference 
defendant suggests, that inference would have been dispelled as soon as defendant told the 
trial court he had nothing to say about the jury's continued deadlock. 
Defendant further seeks to evade responsibility for his consent to the mistrial by 
arguing that his earlier motion could not have constituted consent because it had been 
disposed of and he did not renewed it. Br. Aplt. 13-17. The State, however, does not claim 
that defendant's earlier motion, standing alone, amounted to invited error or consent to the 
mistrial. Rather, the State contends only that having made the motion, defendant 
affirmatively informed the trial court that he objected to continued deliberations by the jury. 
When the jury continued to deadlock, the trial court had no way of knowing that defendant 
no longer objected to continued deliberations unless defendant alerted the court to that fact. 
Thus, by declining to comment on the jury's inability to reach a verdict, defendant in effect 
led the trial court to believe not only that he had no objection to the court's discharging the 
jury, but also that he wanted or consented to the discharge. 
Defendant's reliance on foreign authority does not help him. As defendant 
acknowledges, in the cases he cites, the accused had either affirmatively withdrawn the 
earlier motion, see, e.g., Jones v. Commonwealth, 397 Mass. 607,613,400 N.E.2d 242,246 
(1980), or the trial court had declared a mistrial without warning and on different grounds 
than those asserted by the accused, see, e.g., United States ex rel. Russo v. Superior Court, 
483 F.2d 7, 10-11 (3d Cir.), cert, denied 414 U.S. 1023 (1973); Lovinger v. Circuit Court, 
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845 F.2d 739, 743-44 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 488 U.S. 851 (1988). Here, defendant never 
informed the trial court that he wished to withdraw his original motion or had changed his 
mind about wanting a mistrial. Moreover, the trial court in this case declared the mistrial on 
the same grounds asserted by defendant: a deadlocked jury. 
C. Defendant's claim that he was surprised by the trial court's declaration of a 
mistrial is belied by the record. 
Defendant asserts that he was surprised by the trial court's intention to declare a 
mistrial and therefore had no real opportunity to let the court know he objected. Br. Aplt. 17. 
Defendant's claim is not credible in light of the record. After the bailiff reported a second 
time that the jury could not reach a unanimous decision, the trial court reconvened with the 
jury and both counsel on the record (R. 802:234). In response to the trial court's inquiry, the 
foreman confirmed that the bailiffs report was true (R. 802:234).7 The trial court then asked 
if additional time would "make any difference" (R. 802:234). The foreman replied, "No" (R. 
802:234). The court then asked whether the jury had other questions which, if answered, 
would help the jury reach a decision (R. 802:234-35). The foreman informed the court that 
he did not think it would help (R. 802:235).8 
defendant seems to suggest that the court sua sponte decided to bring the jury 
back to the courtroom. Br. Aplt. 6, 16-17, 19-20. The court, however, specifically told 
the jury that the bailiff had reported that they were unable to reach a verdict and then 
asked if that were true (R. 802:234). This statement makes clear that the court 
reconvened as a result of being informed that the jury was still deadlocked. 
8Although the foreman's response to this questions was partially inaudible, it is 
clear from the context of the entire exchange that he did not believe further deliberations 
would be helpful (R. 802:234-37). Otherwise, the court would not have declared a 
mistrial, but would have asked the jury to continue deliberating. 
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It was apparent from the foregoing questions and answers that the trial court was 
contemplating a mistrial. Thus, when the trial court asked counsel at the end of this 
exchange if there was "any record you would like to make at this point," there could have 
been no doubt that the court was asking if counsel had any objections to the course it was 
clearly planning to take. In view of defendant's earlier objection, the Allen charge, and the 
jury's reaffirmation that it was unable to reach a verdict, defendant cannot reasonably claim 
that he was surprised by the trial court's grant of a mistrial or that he still did not have the 
opportunity to object. That he purposefully chose not to object is supported by the fact that 
he did not do so when, after the jury was excused, the trial court asked a second time if 
defendant had anything else he wanted to say on the record (R. 802:237). 
In sum, defendant invited any error that he now alleges. That invited error was 
tantamount to consent to the mistrial. Defendant, therefore, is not entitled to appellate review 
of his claim. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DISCHARGING THE JURY WHERE THE JURY INDICATED IT 
COULD NOT REACH A VERDICT, WHERE THE TRIAL COURT 
GAVE AN ALLEN CHARGE, AND WHERE DESPITE CONTINUED 
DELIBERATIONS THE JURY AGAIN REPORTED THAT IT WAS 
DEADLOCKED 
Defendant argues that the court of appeals also erred in holding that "legal necessity" 
justified declaring a mistrial. Br. Aplt. 18-26. This Court need not reach this issue unless 
it determines that defendant did not invite the alleged error or did not either expressly or 
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implicitly consent to the mistrial. Should this Court determine that defendant did not invite 
any error, the court of appeals correctly held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in declaring a mistrial. 
A. A genuinely deadlocked jury constitutes legal or manifest necessity. 
"Utah law . . . establishes that discharge of the jury without a verdict operates as an 
acquittal, unless: (1) the defendant consents to the discharge, or (2) "legal necessity" requires 
the discharge in the interest of justice." State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354, 358 (Utah 1979). 
See also Arizona v. Washington, 343 U.S. at 505 ("manifest necessity" must be shown for 
any mistrial declared over defendant's objection).9 A trial judge's belief that the jury is 
"genuinely deadlocked" presents "a classic basis for a proper mistrial." Id. at 509. Accord 
Ambrose, 598 P.2d at 358 n.9; State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1061, 1065 (Utah 1983). In 
other words, a jury unable to agree on a verdict constitutes "legal necessity." See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-403 (1999) (providing that double jeopardy does not bar a retrial where "the 
court finds and states for the record that termination is necessary because . . . [t]he jury is 
unable to agree upon a verdict). 
B. A trial court has broad discretion in determining whether a jury is truly 
deadlocked. 
The broadest discretion is afforded trial judges "in deciding whether or not 'manifest 
necessity' justifies a discharge of the jury." Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. at 509. "[T]he 
rationale for this deference in the 'hung' jury situation is that the trial court is in the best 
9In Ambrose, the Utah Supreme Court equated the term "legal necessity" with 
"manifest necessity." Ambrose, 598 P.2d at 358. 
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position to assess all the factors which must be considered in making a necessarily 
discretionary determination whether the jury will be able to reach a just verdict if it continues 
to deliberate." Id. at 509 n.28. "If retrial of the defendant were barred whenever an appellate 
court views the 'necessity' for a mistrial differently from the trial judge, there would be a 
danger that the latter, cognizant of the serious societal consequences of an erroneous ruling, 
would employ coercive means to break the apparent deadlock. Such a rule would frustrate 
the public interest in just judgments." Id. at 509-10. 
Accordingly, the court of appeals would have been justified in reversing the trial 
court's determination that the jury was unable to reach a verdict only "[i]f the record 
reveal[ed] that the trial judge ha[d] failed to exercise the' sound discretion' entrusted to him." 
Id. at 509 n.28. 
C. The court of appeals correctly determined that the trial court acted well within 
its discretion in determining that the jury was deadlocked. 
The court of appeals correctly determined that on this record the trial court clearly did 
not abuse its discretion in declaring a hung jury. To the contrary, the record demonstrates 
that the trial court "scrupulously" exercised its discretion. See Ambrose, 598 P.2d at 356-57; 
West Valley City v. Patten, 1999 UT App 149, f 11, 981 P.2d 420. 
First, when informed of the deadlock, the trial court read the jury an Allen instruction, 
reminding them of their function and encouraging them to listen earnestly to their fellow 
jurors and deliberate with open minds. When the jury's disagreement persisted, the trial 
court thoughtfully entertained questions from the jury, formulating answers with the 
assistance of both counsel. When the jury still could not reach a verdict, the court pointedly 
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inquired whether the jury had further questions which, if answered, would help them arrive 
at a decision. The trial court relented only when the jury foreperson repeatedly assured it that 
the problem could not be resolved with either additional information or time. 
Second, the trial court entered an explicit finding on the record that the jury was 
unable to reach a verdict (R. 802:236). That finding was not clearly erroneous given the 
jury's repeated stated inability to reach a verdict despite an Allen charge and despite 
receiving answers to their questions. 
Finally, the trial court's declaration of a mistrial was not abrupt nor premature under 
the circumstances. The jury had been deliberating for approximately an hour after the trial 
court had given them the Allen charge (R. 646). As stated in Point I.D, supra, the trial court 
carefully established on the record that the jury was unable to reach a verdict before turning 
to defense counsel and soliciting his comments. It was only after defendant stated he had 
nothing to say that the trial court declared the mistrial. Clearly, defendant was not caught off 
guard by the trial court's action. 
Defendant suggests that the trial court's discharge of the jury was precipitous because 
the jury had only had thirteen minutes to consider the written responses to its questions. Br. 
Aplt. 19-20. Defendant asserts that this was "scarcely" enough time for the jury "to review, 
let alone consider and implement, the court's responses to its handwritten notes." Id. at 20. 
The record does not support that conclusion. Far from acting precipitously, the trial court 
called the jury in only in response to the bailiffs report that the jury could not reach a 
decision (R. 802:234). That second report came after the court had sent its written responses 
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to the jury (R. 802:232-34). The only reasonable inference to be drawn under the 
circumstances is that the jury had reviewed the court's answers, but did not believe they 
would assist the jury in reaching a consensus. Indeed, during the court's inquiry, the foreman 
stated that further answers would not help the jury break its impasse (R. 802:234-37). 
Defendant also implies that "in light of the length of the trial and the volume and 
complexity of the evidence," the jury had not deliberated long enough when the trial court 
excused them. Br. Aplt. 21-23. However, he does not attempt to calculate any minimum 
length of time the jury should have deliberated. In any event, this was not a lengthy or 
complex case. Only four witnesses - a Utah Tax Commission investigator, defendant's 
former employer, a tax return preparer, and defendant - testified (R. 846:19, 118, 129; R. 
802:92). The jury received only 15 instructions in addition to the Allen charge (R. 668-88). 
Although the trial took two days, much of that time was spent injury selection and argument 
of motions outside the jury's presence. Presentation of evidence, argument, and jury 
instruction took only between 8 to 9 hours (see R. 642-43, 645; R. 802:89-90).10 
After hearing what was essentially a nine-hour trial, the jury deliberated more than 
three hours (R. 646). Because the issues were few and the amount of evidence before the 
jury relatively small, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the amount 
of time spent in deliberations was sufficient to conclude that the jury could not agree. See, 
e.g. People v. Price, 821 P.2d 610, 695 (Cal. 1991) ("Whether the jury has had sufficient 
l0On the first day of trial, the jury did not hear any evidence until 1:51 p.m. and 
was excused at 4:27 p.m. (R. 642-43). On the second day, the jury did not hear any 
evidence until 1:15 p.m. (R. 802:89-90). 
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time to deliberate, and whether there is no reasonable probability of a verdict are 
determinations committed to the sound discretion of the trial court."), cert, denied, 506 U.S. 
851 (1992); Jones v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1228,1229 (Ind. 1989) (trial court has discretion to 
determine whether declaration of a mistrial is appropriate in hung jury situation). 
Defendant further complains that the jury apparently did not fully understand its 
responsibility to honestly try to reach a decision. Br. Aplt. 21-22. He charges that a trial 
court "confronted with premature protestations of deadlock, has a duty to educate that jury 
and to charge it anew." Id. This claim amounts to a complaint that the trial court was 
obligated to give the jury an Allen charge and encourage it to continue deliberating. The trial 
court in fact did educate the jury when, over defendant's objection, it gave them the Allen 
charge that he now claims was so essential. 
D. The trial court could reasonably rely on the jury foreperson's representations 
in determining that the jury was deadlocked. 
Defendant argues that the court's "cursory" inquiry of the jury foreman was 
inadequate to satisfy the manifest necessity standard. Br. Aplt. 23-25. He suggests that the 
court should have sua sponte questioned the jurors individually to verify that the jury was 
truly deadlocked. Id. 
Utah law has never imposed a requirement that each juror must be questioned 
individually before a trial court can declare a mistrial. Since the trial court occupies an 
advantaged position to determine whether a mistrial is proper, such a requirement is neither 
necessary nor desirable. See State v. Castle, 951 P.2d 1109, 1113 (Utah App. 1998) 
(appellate court defers to trial court's decision to declare mistrial because '[w]e are wholly 
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unable to glean from the typewritten record 'body language' factors that may have weighed 
heavily in the judge's decision . . . which can only be observed by one person in the 
courtroom"). It may very well be that the trial court saw no need to individually question the 
jurors because they nodded or otherwise showed assent when the foreperson represented that 
they were hopelessly deadlocked. 
Under the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in relying on the 
foreman's representations that the jury was unable to reach a verdict. See State v. Dykstra, 
656 P.2d 1137, 1140 (Wash. App.) (while polling of individual jurors is not necessarily 
precluded, "the court has the discretion to rely on the representations of the foreman"), 
review denied, 99 Wash. 2d 1014 (Wash. 1983). 
In sum, defendant simply has not shown that the court of appeals was incorrect in 
holding the trial court in this case did not abuse its discretion when it declared a mistrial. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm the court 
of appeals. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Constitutional Provisions and Statutes 
CONSTITUTION or THI UNITE) JTATII 
AMENDMENT V 
^Criminal actions—Provisions concerning — Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No ptrtoa ahall bo hold to u m r for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
erime, unless oa • presentment or iadietmoat oft Grand Jury, except ia eaaot 
•ruing ia tho land or naval forces, or ia tho Militia whoa ia actual aorvieo ia 
time of War or public daagor, aor shall any person bo subject for tho I U M 
off«ncotob«twic«putinjoop4rdyoflif(iorliinb;nor«haUUcomp«l]»diaany 
criminal eaao to bo a witaoai agaiaat himself, aor t» doprivod of life, liberty, 
or property, without duo oncost of law, aor ahall private property bo takoa for 
public use, without Juat componsatioa. 
Art I, I IS coNtmvnoK or UTAH 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
Ia criminal prosecutions tho accused ahall have the right to appear and 
iefend ia peraoa aad by counsel, to demand tho nature aad cause of the 
•ccusatioa agaiaat him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in hia owa behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses agaiaat him, to have compulsory process to 
Eorapel the attendance of witnesses ia his owa behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which tho offense ia 
illeged to have beta committed, aad tho right to afpoal ia all cases. Ia no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, bo compelled to 
idvaace money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. Tie accused 
ihall not bo compelled to give evidence agaiaat himselfi a wife shall not bo 
aomueUad to tettifV against her husband, aor a husband against hia wife, aor 
shall any person be twice put ia Jeopardy for tho tame offer 
UTAH CRIMINAL CODI 
76-1-403. Former proaecution birring subsequent pros-
ecution for offense out of same epitode* 
(1) If s dtftndtnt htt bttn prottcuted for ont or mors offtnsts arisinf out 
of t singlt criminal tpitodt, t substqutnt prottcution for tht saint or a 
difftrtnt offtntt trising out of tht stmt criminal tpitodt it barrtd if 
(a) Tht subttqutnt prottcution it far tn offtntt that wat or should hart 
bttn tritd undtr Subttction 76-1-402(2) in tht farmer prottcution; and 
(b) Tht fonntr prottcution: 
(i) rttulttd in acquittal; or 
(ii) rttulttd in conviction; or 
(iii) was improperly terminated; or 
(iv) was ttnninattd by t final ordtr or judgmtnt for tht dtftndtnt 
that has not bttn rtvtrstd, stt tsidtf or vtcattd and that ntctssarily 
rtquirtd t dtttrminttion inconsistent with a fact that must be 
esttblishtd to stcurt conviction in tht substqutnt prottcution. 
(2) Thtrt is tn acquittal if tht prottcution rttulttd in t finding of not guilty 
by tht trior of (acts or in a dtttrminttion that thtrt was intuffidtnt tvidtnct 
to warrant conviction. A finding of guilty of a lttttr indudtd offtntt is an 
acquittal of tht grttttr offtntt tvtn though tht conviction for tht lttttr 
indudtd offtntt it oubttqutntly rtvtrstdf stt tsidt, or vtctttd. (3) Thtrt it t conviction if tht prottcution rttulttd in t judgmtnt of guilt 
that hat not bttn rtvtrstd, stt tsidt, or vtctttd; t vtrdict of guilty that hat not 
bttn rtvtrstdt stt ttidt, or vtctttd and that it ctptblt of supporting a 
judgmtnt; or t pita of guilty acctpttd by the court 
(4) Tlitrt it tnimproptrttiminttion of prottcution . 
pi set btfort tht vtrdict, it for rtttont not amounting to tn acquittal, and taktt 
pltct tfttr t jury hat bttn imptntlltd and sworn to try tht dtftndtnt, or, if tht 
jury trial it wtivtd, tfttr tht first witnttt is sworn. Howtvtr, ttrminttion of 
prottcution it not improptr i£ 
(t) Tht dtftndtnt conttntt to tht termination; or 
(b) Tht dtftndtnt waivtt hit right to otytct to tht ttrminttion; 
(c) Tht court findt and ttattt far the rtcord thtt tht ttrminttion it 
ntcttttry btcauac 
(i) It it physically impottiUt to procttd with tht trial in conformity 
with tht law; or 
(ii) Thtrtisskgaldtftctinthtprocttdinanottttributeblttotht 
state that would makt tny judgmtnt tnterta upon t vtrdict rtvtrt-
iblt tt t matter of law; or 
(iii) Prejudicial conduct la or out of tht courtroom not sttributablt 
to tht tttte maktt it impossiblt to procttd with tht trial without 
injustict to tht dtftndtnt or tht state; or 
(iv) Tht jury it unablt to agrat upon t vtrdict; or 
(v) Ftltt statemtntt of a juror on voir dirt prtvtnt t fair trial. 
ADDENDUM B 
Partial Transcript of Defendant's Motion for Mistrial 
(R. 802:227-30) 
1 Counsel, if you will make sure that you can be contacted 
2 by telephone if you're not here in the courthouse. Just let the clerk 
3 know what number to use to call you. 
4 We'll then recess and return when the jury is finished 
5 deliberating. Anything? Any questions? 
6 MR. PRISBREY: No. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. The Court is in recess. 
8 (Court recess). 
9 THE COURT: The Court is back on the record now to 
10 speak to counsel concerning the report from the bailiff that the jurors 
11 have asked about - 1 guess its best to say what happens if they don't 
12 reach agreement or - maybe I'd better just let you report exactly what 
13 was said to you because I'm not paraphrasing it well. 
14 THE BAILIFF: The jury indicated they were unable to 
15 reach a decision. They were instructed just to stand by and the Court 
16 will be consulted. (Inaudible). 
17 THE COURT: All right Thank you. I have discussed 
18 with counsel an additional instruction that I have in my standard set but 
19 t don't give routinely because its an instruction that has to do with a 
20 jury thats having difficulty reaching a verdict 
21 Counsel have seen the instruction. Do you want to make 
22 any comments regarding that instruction and the suggestion that it be 
23 given to the jury to see if they can reach a verdict? 
24 MR. PRISBREY: No. I don't have any objection to the 
25 body of the instruction. In chambers, we discussed the case that that 
1 was based on. But I do have an objection as far as the giving of the 
2 instruction to the jury and would ask that the Court declare a hung jury 
3 and that there be a mistrial. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. Any particular basis other than that? 
5 That would be your preference? 
6 (No verbal response on tape). 
7 THE COURT: Knowing, of course, the time is a little bit 
8 after 9:00, the jurors have been deliberating for a few hours. Not long, I 
9 supposed, by some standards. Perhaps long by other standards. I 
10 don't know. 
11 MR. PRISBREY: And just the basis that they had 
12 indicated they could not reach a verdict 
13 THE COURT: Okay. All right Mr. Meyers, do you have 
14 any comment? 
15 MR. MEYERS: The State favors giving them the 
16 instruction. Two hours isn't an excessively long time. I think we ought 
17 to encourage them to try one more time here. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. In my view, the time has not been 
19 excessive with a two-day trial. The instruction is fairly routine coming 
20 from ABA standards reported in the Utah case law. 
21 I would like to at least see if this makes any difference, my 
22 reading the instruction. But I don't intend to have the jurors locked up 
23 or try to force them to reach a verdict if they're not able to do that. 
24 I would like them to consider one other instruction to see 
25 whether it makes any difference. Of course, none of us have any idea 
1 what the deadlock, if there is one, is about. 
2 So, I think I will have the bailiff bring them in, read this 
3 instruction, and give them some additional time and then see what the 
4 result is, if anything. 
5 Would you bring the jurors in, please? 
6 MR. PRISBREY: We don't have copies of that. 
7 THE COURT: I had the copies for you in there. I only 
8 have left the ones I was going to give to the jury. Would you like one of 
9 these? 
10 MR. PRISBREY: Sure. 
11 THE COURT: You can go ahead and take that. 
12 MR. PRISBREY: May I approach? 
13 THE COURT: All rise for the jury. 
14 (In presence of jury). 
15 THE COURT: Please, be seated. The record will now 
16 reflect the members of the jury have returned to the courtroom. 
17 Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the bailiff has reported 
18 that you have reported to him at this point being unable to reach a 
19 verdict I don't intend to force you to go on for any unreasonable length 
20 of time. 
21 I would like to give you one additional instruction and give 
22 you some additional time to consider this instruction and deliberate 
23 further. This is one that I have reviewed with the attorneys and they 
24 are aware of the instruction and its contents and its purpose. Let me 
25 read this to you and then I'm going to ask you to return to the jury room 
1 for some short period of time to consider this and deliberate further 
2 This will be instruction No. 16. 
3 You have previously been instructed that in order to return 
4 a verdict, each juror must agree to the same verdict. You have the duty 
5 to consult with each other and to deliberate with a view to reaching an 
6 agreement if it can be done without abandoning your individual 
7 judgment. 
8 Each juror must decide the case for himself or herself but 
9 only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with the other 
10 jurors. 
11 You should deliberate together in an atmosphere of 
12 mutual difference and respect, giving due consideration to the views of 
13 the others. 
14 In the course of deliberations, you should not hesitate to 
15 re-examine your own views and change your opinion if you are 
16 convinced that it is erroneous. On the other hand, you should not 
17 surrender your honest convictions as to the weight or effect of the 
18 evidence solely because of the opinions of other jurors or for the sole 
19 purpose of reaching a verdict 
20 I'll initial that instruction. It will be provided to you. There 
21 will be a couple of copies of that that you can pass around and 
22 consider. And I'll ask you now to return to the jury room with the bailiff 
23 and deliberate further to see whether a verdict can be reached on the 
24 case. 
25 All rise for the jury. 
ADDENDUM C 
Partial Transcript of Court's Colloquy with Jury Foreman 
(R. 802:234-37) 
1 MR. MEYERS: "Please, see instructions 5 and 6." 
2 MR. PRISBREY: Yeah. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. Do you want to see those before 
4 they go back in? 
5 MR. MEYERS: No. 
6 THE COURT: All right. We'll stop the record at this point 
7 and continue. 
8 (Court recess). 
9 THE COURT: We're again back on the record. The 
10 members of the jury are returned to the courtroom. The parties are 
11 present The attorneys are present 
12 Let me ask first of all who was selected as the 
13 chairperson of the jury? 
14 (No verbal response on tape). 
15 THE COURT: Mr. Holt? 
16 JUROR HOLT: Yes. 
17 THE COURT: All right And the report I've received 
18 through the bailiff is that the jury has been unable to reach a unanimous 
19 decision. Is that correct? 
20 JUROR HOLT: Yes. 
21 THE COURT: All right Do you think that any additional 
22 period of time for deliberation would make any difference? 
23 JUROR HOLT: No. 
24 THE COURT: All right All right And do you have any 
25 question that you want to ask about that? There have been a couple of 
1 notes passed and some response given, although perhaps not as much 
2 response as you had hoped. Any question or -
3 JUROR HOLT: No. (Inaudible). 
4 THE COURT: All right. Are those questions that you 
5 have not sent out to me so far? 
6 JUROR HOLT: Weil, yes and no. 
7 THE COURT: Yes and no. Okay. All right. I guess I 
8 need to make sure I understand then. If there were a couple of 
9 questions answered, do you think you could reach a verdict or it would 
10 be at least worth deliberating longer or do you think that would just 
11 confirm the positions or decisions that the jurors have reached? 
12 JUROR HOLT: Well, speaking for myself, it would 
13 probably (inaudible). 
14 THE COURT: Okay. Ail right 
15 Counsel, is there any record that you would like to make 
16 at this point? 
17 MR. PRISBREY: I don't have anything, your Honor. 
18 MR MEYERS: No, your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: All right All right 
20 Well, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I'm not going to 
21 require you to stay any longer. I am going to release you from your 
22 duties here and excuse you to go home. 
23 You have been diligent in your efforts and the parties and 
24 I appreciate your efforts and your diligence and your commitment to 
25 doing this type of duty. 
1 This service is certainly not compensated for by the small 
2 amount that you're paid. I suppose the only thing I can tell you about 
3 that is if s a whole lot better now than it was before the first of July 
4 when the statute changed. But it still, I know, doesn't compensate for 
5 the disruption of your lives and the work that you're called upon to 
6 perform. 
7 But I'm going to declare that there is a mistrial, that the 
8 jury is not able to reach a verdict, and I'll excuse you and release you 
9 from your admonition. That will mean that you are now free to discuss 
10 the case with anyone that you want to talk to about the case. 
11 There may be people who are very interested in speaking 
12 to you. And if you want to discuss the case and your deliberations, feel 
13 free to do that If you don't want to discuss it, you're also free to make 
14 that decision and just inform anyone who wants to talk to you that you'd 
15 rather not talk about it 
16 I've never had it happen, but I still always try to make the 
17 offer to members of a jury that if you have difficulty avoiding someone in 
18 particular who just insists on trying to talk to you and you don't want to 
19 talk about your service here, feel free to call the courthouse and talk to 
20 me about it and I'll see rf there's anything that ought to be done. Again, 
21 that's never happened. So, I don't expect it will. But I'd like to at least 
22 make that offer in the unlikely event that you had some difficulty with 
23 that 
24 In addition, if there are any questions you'd like to ask me 
25 or ask the attorneys after the Court adjourns here, I'd be happy to meet 
1 with you in the jury room in about two minutes. You can speak to the 
2 attorneys anytime you want to. If you don't want to wait or if you don't 
3 have any questions, that certainly is understandable. Thaf s entirely up 
4 to you. 
5 But thank you again for your participation and your effort 
6 and your service in this regard. You are all now excused. 
7 Counsel, is there anything else for the record this 
8 evening? 
9 MR. PRISBREY: No, your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: All right Then the Court will stand 
11 adjourned until tomorrow. 
12 oOo 
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ADDENDUM D 
Trial Court's Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
VALDEN CRAM, 
Defendant, 
ORDER 
CASE NO. 961501097 
JUDGE G. RAND BEACHAM 
On Monday, February 191999, a hearing was held before the Honorable Judge G. Rand 
Beacham on the above captioned case regarding Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Defendant was 
present and represented by counsel Aaron J. Prisbey. Assistant Attorney General Wade S. 
Winegar represented the State. After hearing argument from both counsel, the Court makes the 
following findings and order 
Pi 
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The Court hereby finds that according to U.C.A. 76-1 -403 and Utah case law on the 
issue, the mistrial declared in this matter on August 18,1998 was not an improper termination of 
the prosecution and resulted because the jury was unable to agree upon a verdict The Court 
further finds a proper record was made at the time the mistrial was declared and thus orders as 
follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss be denied. 
Dated this tfr^dav of February, 1 
G. Rand Beacham 
District Court Judge 
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State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appallea, 
v. 
Valdan Gram, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Fifth District, St. George Department 
The Honorable 0. Rand Beacham 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 99050S-CA 
F I L E D 
(December 21, 2000) 
2000 UT APP 375 
Attorneys: Aaron J. Prisbrey, St. George, for Appellant 
Jan Graham and Laura B. Dupaix, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee 
Before Judges Jackson, Davis, and Thome. 
THORNS, Judge: 
Defendant Valdan Cram appeals from an order denying his 
motion to dismiss a subsequent charge, following the trial 
court's declaration of mistrial. We affirm. 
Defendant argues that the trial court's denial of his motion 
to dismiss violates the Fifth Amendment right against being twice 
put in jeopardy for the same criminal offense.1 We disagree. 
Defendant's motion to dismiss followed the trial court's decision 
to declare a mistrial after determining that the jury waa unable 
to reach a verdict. Defendant made no objection to the trial 
court'a decision to declare a mistrial.1 We have explained that 
1. Defendant also argues that the trial court'a dismissal of his 
motion violates Utah Const, art. I, S 12, but ha presents this 
court no independent analysis of how the trial court'a ruling 
violates the State constitutional provision, therefore, we do not 
address this issue. Sfim Utah R. App. P. 24. 
2. In fact, defendant waited until the scheduling conference for 
the new trial to alert the court of his objection to the 
(continued...) 
"Utah courts require specific objections in order 'to bring all 
claimed errors to the trial court's attention to give the court 
an opportunity to correct the errors if appropriate.'" state v. 
3X£wn, 356 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted). This is particularly true where, as here, 
the trial court could have resolved defendant's timely objection 
before the jury was discharged. 
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court 
may not ba raised on appeal." state v. Holcata. 2000 UT 74,111, 
10 P.3d 346 (citing State v. Marvin. 964 P.2d 313, 313 (Utah 
1998)). The preservation rule, as it is known, "applies to every 
claim, including constitutional aueationa.» ££*. (emphasis 
added). Utah does, however, recognize three exceptions to the 
preservation rule: (1) plain error, (2) exceptional 
circumstances, and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel. See 
State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Defendant fails to argue any of these three exceptions to 
the preservation rule. Rather, defendant acknowledges chat he 
knew the court was contemplating a mistrial, but believed he was 
not obligated to object. Defendant was in error. "[A] defendant 
should not be permitted to forego making an objection with the 
strategy of 'enhancCing] the defendant's chances of acquittal and 
then, if that strategy fails, . . . claim[ing] on appeal that the 
Court should reverse.'* Holaate. 2000 OT 74 at 111 (alterations 
in original) (citation omitted). Accordingly, defendant has 
failed to adequately preserve his objection. 
Were we to address the merits of defendant's double jeopardy 
claim, our ultimate conclusion would not change. The Utah 
Supreme Court has explained that "[w]hen . . . the jury is unable 
to reach a verdict, . . . a defendant may be retried 
notwithstanding the double jeopardy clause.• state v. Muaaelman. 
667 P.2d 1061, 106S (Utah 1983) (emphasis added) (citing Lea v. 
United Statea. 432 U.S. 23, 97 S. Ct. 2141 (1977); State v. 
Jaramillo. 25 Utah 2d 32S, 481 P.2d 394 (1971); State v. Gardner. 
62 Utah 62, 217 P. 97« (1923); United Staeaa v. Scott. 437 U.S. 
32, 98 S. Ct. 2187 (1980)); a^ alaa Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-403(4) 
(1999) (codifying the protection against double jeopardy). 
However, "Utah court* have interpreted the protection against 
double jeopardy . . . to mean that upon the declaration of 
mistrial, a defendant may not be retried on the same charge 
unless a 'legal necessity1 justified termination of the trial." 
Weae Valley City v. Patten. 1999 UT App 149,1l0, 931 P.2d 420 
(citation omitted). 
2. (...continued) 
mistrial. 
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In Patten, we set forth the standards previously articulated 
by our supreme court in State v. Ambrose, 598 p.2d 3S4 (Utah 
1979), for determining whether "legal necessity" exists for 
granting a mistrial. First, the "trial court must give an 
explanation for its decision and discuss possible 'curative 
alternatives to a mistrial.'" Patten. 1999 UT App 14 at 111 
(citation omitted). "Second, the trial court must enter findings 
of fact supporting its decision . . . ." idL Finally, the trial 
court "may not declare a mistrial 'so abruptly . . . that 
defendant's counsel haCs] no opportunity to object.'" id. 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
In the present matter, the trial court, on two separate 
occasions, inquired of the jury foreperson whether additional 
deliberation time or the court answering additional questions 
would facilitate a verdict. On both occasions, the jury 
foreperson responded "no." We conclude that the trial court 
discussed "'possible curative alternatives to a mistrial." id*, 
(citation omitted). 
The dialogue between the trial court and the jury 
foreperson, the subsequent Minute Entry chronicling the time the 
jury deliberated, the court's supplemental "deadlock" instruction 
to the jury, and the time spent conferring with counsel--all 
contained in the record--demonstrate that sufficient grounds 
exist to support the trial court's declaration of mistrial, we 
conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
declaring a mistrial. 
Finally, the trial court clearly did "not declare a mistrial 
'so abruptly . . . that defendant's counsel hatdj no opportunity 
to object.'" H * (quoting *fhrfflll 598 P.2d at 360). The trial 
court, on two separate occasions, asked defendant's counsel if he 
would like to go oa record in response to the jury's inability to 
reach a verdict or inquire of the jury foreperson. Defendant's 
counsel declined oa both occasions. Accordingly, we are 
convinced that the trial court complied with the standards set 
forth in >"twHM «ad that a "'legal necessity' justified 
termination of [defendant's] trial." Id*, at 1l0 (citation 
omitted). That trial judge was properly exercising his discretion 
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when he declared a mistrial. Double jeopardy does not bar 
defendant's subsequent retrial and conviction. 
Denial of defendant's motion to dismiss is affirmed. 
Lliam A. Thorn*, Jr.,'Judg« Will 
WE CONCUR: 
Normafe H. Jackson,, 
AssociafiA^Prtsiding Judge 
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